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1 Introduction 
 The Pacific Basin is the most robust economic region of the world. Over half the 
world’s population resides in countries bordering on it, and this region’s average economic 
growth rate has been double that of the rest of the world since 1970. The volume of trade 
on the Pacific is three times that on the Atlantic and has been growing twice as fast. In less 
than a generation, this region has become the global pacesetter for market-based economic 
development and a model of efficient international specialization. This volume examines a 
number of leading issues facing the Pacific Basin, collecting the research and opinions of 
experts from around the region on its economic prospects into the next generation. In 
particular, some of these authors examine the received history of trade rivalry and the new 
initiatives for regional cooperation in trade. Another series of papers examines Pacific 
multilateralism from the capital account perspective, detailing a complex web of foreign 
direct investment linkages that now pervades the region. Finally, two papers examine an 
important emergent issue in the region and the world — links between trade, sustainable 
resource use, and the environment. Taken together, these studies cover issues of the 
highest priority for policy dialogue and research, in this region and in the context of 
multilateralism generally, now and for the foreseeable future. 
 As we enter the Pacific Century, an unprecedented set of promises and challenges 
lies ahead. Can a new global paradigm of market-based, open multilateralism provide the 
economic momentum to lift the majority of humankind out of poverty at last? Can such a 
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complex mosaic of trading economies also provide a basis for sustained cooperation, peace, 
and political stability? There are no definitive answers to these questions, but recent 
history and current trends appear to justify an optimistic perspective. At the same time, 
however, the promise of sustained economic prosperity must be tempered with real 
concern about how the diverse and partially conflicting aims of so vast an area can be 
reconciled.  
 Table 1.1 provides GNP per capita and other economic indicators for 15 major Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries.1 An extremely large variance in GNP 
per capita among these countries indicates that the APEC members are at very different 
stages of development. In 1995, China’s per capita income of $620 was only about 1.6 
percent of Japan’s per capita income of $39,640. If GNP is measured at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) dollars — i.e., using a common set of prices for goods and services — instead 
of using nominal exchange rates, then the ratio of the lowest to highest per capita income 
countries in the region would increase to about 10.8 percent.  
 The economic dynamism we see in the region today has arisen from two trends that 
are inextricably linked, rapid domestic growth and expanding trade.2 Japan led the postwar 
expansion, growing at an average rate of 8.2 percent from 1955 to 1980, and was followed 
by “Four Tigers”, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore that together grew by 8.8 
percent from 1965 to 1990. More recently, China and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) members have experienced unprecedented growth rates. China’s real 
GDP grew by an annual average of 9.5 percent over the period 1980-1995. Other high-
performing Asian economies (HPAEs) — Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia — grew by 
7.2 percent per annum from 1970 to 1995.3  Indeed, it is remarkable to see how, across this 
immense region, a few decades of market forces has delivered higher living standards than 
did several generations of traditional development policy. 
                                                 
1 Three APEC members — Brunei, Papua New Guinea, and Chile — are not included in the table 
because of their small economic size relative to the other 15 members. 
2 Growth rates across the region are summarized in Table 1.1. 
3 While the Philippines was an exception in that it experienced an extremely turbulent period with the 
debt crisis, the subsequent application of a stringent IMF adjustment program, and severe recessions 
over the period 1982-92, its economy has achieved a steady growth in recent years. 
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 In all these cases, trade with much larger external markets leveraged the expansion 
of domestic GDP. The exports to GDP ratios increased sharply in most East Asian 
countries between 1970 and 1995 (Table 1.1), indicating sharply rising participation in the 
global economy. The increases were particularly dramatic in China (2.9 percent in 1970 to 
21.5 percent in 1995), Korea (9.5 to 27.5 percent), Hong Kong (66.5 to 120.9 percent), 
Malaysia (42.5 to 83.1 percent), and Thailand (10.0 to 31.6 percent). 
 The success of these trading economies had no precedent since the times of 
Western colonialism. Unlike their predecessors, however, the early Asian exporters (Japan 
and Four Tigers) did not rely on political power to project their economic interests abroad. 
Instead, they used a combination of disciplined domestic industrial policies and aggressive 
international competition to penetrate established Western markets. Although there were 
significant reciprocal trade flows from these trading partners, the approach was essentially 
neo-mercantilist. National industry groups sought ever-increasing exports to stimulate 
domestic capacity, meeting foreign competitors on their own terrain and opening market 
share against domestic import substitutes. At the same time, domestic growth in these 
countries was financed by a combination of retained profits from domestic and foreign 
operations. Sustained trade surpluses made an essential contribution, accelerating the 
growth of domestic savings and investment in these export-dependent countries. Among 
the results of this approach were rapid capital accumulation, meteorically rising incomes, 
and often problematic bilateral trade relationships. Because of its bias towards national 
industry, internal finance, and asymmetric trade, the traditional model of export orientation 
has led to chronic dissonance of trade policies and impeded the progress of multilateralism. 
Voluntary export restraints (VERs) on Japanese autos, the Multifibre agreement (MFA), 
and a long litany of actual and threatened retaliatory trade measures are all evidence of this. 
 In addition to export-led industrialization, there are other noteworthy similarities 
between earlier and more recent Asian Pacific growth. As was the case for the more 
mature economies, income growth in the new Asian exporters is relatively egalitarian. We 
identify this with an enterprise and investor emphasis on human resource development that 
foster steadily rising labor productivity, real wages, and labor market flexibility. These 
attributes, in turn, lead ultimately to greater economic diversification and more balanced 
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and sustainable growth. Such an approach can be contrasted with some Latin American 
economies, for example, whose colonial experience with resource boom export activities 
has fostered an apparent bias against investment in human capital.  
 Despite their similarities, however, early and modern Asian Pacific exporters differ 
in very important ways. Firstly, the latter countries are exporting not only to Europe and 
North America, but to the world’s most rapidly growing regional market, the Asian Pacific 
itself. Since 1980, intraregional trade has expanded twice as fast as trade with the rest of 
the world.4 At the same time, developing Asian countries are rapidly diversifying beyond 
the traditional primary products that were the mainstay of regional exports to the North. 
More than just an alternative to Northern markets, Asian Pacific regional trade is 
qualitatively different. Export opportunities have been created largely through new 
domestic growth in importing countries rather than by market penetration. This increases 
the net gains from trade for both parties, supercedes important obstacles to market 
openness, and facilitates cooperation. 
 A second important difference in the outward orientation of today’s Asian Pacific 
growth economies is microeconomic in nature — a pervasive trend toward joint ventures 
that might be termed “private multilateralism.” Long before the Uruguay Round was 
successfully negotiated or the terms APEC, AFTA, and even NAFTA were coined, private 
business interests have been forging alliances for trade and domestic market development 
that transcend national boundaries. 5  Nowhere has this trend been more rapid and 
diversified than in the Asian Pacific, where nearly every permutation of nationalities has 
joined together to work across markets and jurisdictions, pooling expertise, market access, 
and capital to take fuller advantage of economies-of-scale and informational and other 
externalities. The result contrasts sharply with the narrower national economic interests of 
the older export economies, and represents a spontaneous and more intrinsic form of the 
liberal trading spirit so laboriously enunciated in regional and global trade agreements. 
                                                 
4 During 1980-95, intra-APEC trade grew 10.7 percent per annum while APEC countries’ trade with the 
rest of the world grew 5.5 percent per annum. 
5 For reference, the acronyms refer to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA). 
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 Evidence of the advantages of private multilateralism can also be found in the 
capital accounts. Instead of relying on investment resources to accrue from perennial trade 
surpluses, newly emergent economies in the region are benefiting from vast infusions of 
foreign direct investment. Sometimes referred to as Tiger’s Milk, much of this growth of 
capital originates within the region itself and from joint ventures that represent complex 
marketing alliances. This more elaborate process of capitalization is an essential attribute 
of the new model of export-led, investment driven growth, including significant new 
advantages like technology transfer and a more collaborative basis of market linkages. The 
historic, one-country approach to rapid Asian growth, typified by Japan and the Four 
Tigers, has given way to extensive private networks of investment syndication arising with 
joint commercial and financial ventures. Taken together, the collective forces of this 
“Invisible Handshake” give rise to a myriad of commercial linkages for market participants 
and pervasive growth externalities for their domestic economies. 
 Thus it is reasonable to argue that there exists in the Asian Pacific a new paradigm 
for the outward-oriented economy.  Such an economy draws a significant growth impetus 
from the global economy, but not by developing a national commercial export platform 
from which to penetrate foreign markets, maximize net exports, and relentlessly 
accumulate savings from at home and abroad. The modern outward-oriented economy 
opens itself to fuller participation in a complex web of self-interested but mutually 
advantageous trade and investment linkages. Many of these take the form of explicit joint 
ventures, but most arise as spontaneous market interactions. The private sector across the 
Pacific Basin has already developed this multilateralism to a relatively high degree (by 
comparison to other regions), and a number of regional initiatives (e.g. APEC) are being 
crafted to formalize the institutional context for this. If the promise of these agreements is 
fulfilled, we may see a new and more collaborative basis for prosperity that could 
significantly improve long-term prospects for stability and security in the region and 
throughout world. 
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2 Overview of Regional Trade Patterns 
 Trade is the animating force behind domestic economic growth and multilateral 
relations across the Pacific region, and the papers in this volume examine many specific 
aspects of this phenomenon. To introduce this work, however, we begin with a broad 
overview of historical trade patterns. These trends clearly reveal a transition from more 
focused, bilateral trade ties, from traditional, neo-mercantilist and even neo-colonial trade 
to a new, more diversified regime. Today’s Pacific Basin is a complex universe of 
multilateralism, arising not from negotiating tables, but from the myriad initiatives of 
market forces. Indeed, it is striking how rapidly regional trade has advanced ahead of 
regional conventions such as APEC. Although stubborn details about trade barriers and 
distortions still need to be resolved, the spontaneous potential of this market is 
remarkable.6 
 The four panels of Table 1.2 lay out detailed patterns of bilateral and multilateral 
trade for the region over the last fifteen years. These will provide a useful reference for 
reading other parts of the book, but it is also worth digressing here to examine the 
evolution of trade relations from the Pacific perspective. Panel A of Table 1.2 details trade 
shares for leading East Asian economies for the years 1980, 1990, and 1995.7 The trade 
destinations included in this table are the same East Asian economies and, in the first 
trading partner column, an aggregate of these. The most notable feature of these results is 
the steady growth of the “internal” East Asian market. Many of these countries now trade 
more than half their goods within the region and this share has increased substantially in 
the last fifteen years for all but one.8 Apart from this, only China saw its East Asian trade 
                                                 
6 Indeed, the relative caution of Asian parties to APEC may be a partial concession to market forces as 
the leading agent of regional growth and change. Markets are, after all, designed to take risks, and 
politicians are notoriously reluctant to do so.  
7 In all the entries of these tables, trade is defined as the sum of exports and imports with respect to the 
two trading partners under consideration. 
8 Only Indonesia’s regional share has fallen, but this country’s trade statistics are misleading for two 
reasons, both related to its primary export good. Oil prices have dropped significantly during the period 
considered, and their revenues are denominated in a currency (the US dollar) that has depreciated 
significantly against the dominant East Asian currency (the Japanese yen). 
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share decline from 1990 to 1995, because of booming trade with the US, but still targeted 
over half its trade with neighboring Pacific countries. 
 Most countries actually reduced or held steady their share of trade with Japan, still 
the dominant regional importer. The most rapid growth in trade opportunities came instead 
from the Four Tigers and other emerging regional partners. Such diversification within the 
region represents both vertical and horizontal market expansions. In the first case, the 
emerging traders are fitting into the lower tiers of more complex trade hierarchies, 
including economies at the early, intermediate, and advanced stages of industrialization. 
This tendency has been particularly evident in association with the avalanche of FDI into 
China and Southeast Asia. Over the past ten years, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have sharply 
increased their commitments in these markets, building links to subsidiaries or partners in 
the host countries who then export intermediate goods to the investor’s home country or its 
subsidiaries elsewhere. In the latter case, horizontal expansion, they are participating in 
widening regional distribution systems. This growth is usually mediated by complex 
commercial alliances, in which the new partners enjoy more equal status and many growth 
externalities. 
This trend can be contrasted with older, bilateral spoke links to hubs in Japan and the 
industrialized west. Most of these situations entailed projection of domestic marketing and 
production operations abroad, and the growth externalities for destination countries were 
more limited. 
 Apart from general trends, there are several specific aspects of internal East Asian 
trade worth highlighting. Despite its decline as a regional trade partner, Japan has steadily 
expanded its own sales in the region, increasing trade share in all East Asian economies 
except in Indonesia.9  For most of the countries considered, Japan’s trade share rose more 
than one third in five years from 1990 to 1995. 
 As one might expect, the implications of historical trade patterns between China, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan are complex. Chinese trade dependence on Hong Kong dropped 
precipitously from 1990 to 1995, largely as a result of developing its direct trade capacity 
                                                 
9 While the decline in the oil price reduced Japan’s imports from Indonesia during 1980-95, its exports 
to Indonesia also declined as a result of the sharp appreciation of the yen during the period.  
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in the southeast and elsewhere. China still has the largest trade share to Hong Kong (15.9 
percent) but is closely followed by Taiwan, with whom it has negligible bilateral shares.10 
One might expect the events of 1997 to exert some adjustment pressure on these trade 
flows. For its part, Hong Kong has the biggest relative commitment to intra-East Asian 
trade, but 34.8 percent of its 63 percent regional trade share is directed to China. Thus the 
accord of 1997 will internalize over half of Hong Kong’s East Asian trade. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1.2 HERE> 
 
 Panel B of Table 1.2 summarizes the composition of total trade flows from the 
same East Asian countries. In addition to East Asia itself, trade with other destinations in 
the Pacific Basin and elsewhere are given. Among the most arresting features of this table 
is the predominance of APEC trade. For all the East Asian economies represented here, 
APEC accounts for two-thirds to three-quarters of their total trade by 1995. Of particular 
interest is how Japan has diversified toward APEC since 1980, moving from 51.6 to 70.4 
percent of total trade. These figures make plain the stakes for APEC members. 
 Among individual countries, the U.S. is the largest non-East Asian destination. 
While this is hardly surprising given the size of its economy, it still exceeds large regional 
groupings such as Europe, Latin America, and the rest of the world aggregate. In most 
cases, the U.S. represents one-quarter to one-half of APEC trade for each East Asian 
country (1995). Although one might reasonably expect these shares to diminish over time 
(as indeed they have done in many cases), they help explain the special status accorded to 
this country in trade negotiations. 
 East Asian trade links to the rest of NAFTA are still negligible and have fallen 
somewhat since that agreement was signed, but this may have more to do with the decline 
of the Mexican economy than with trade diversion. Despite the initiative of some countries 
(Japan, China, Korea, and Taiwan), Latin America remains a marginal trade partner for 
                                                 
10 There is an inconsistency in reporting trade data by China and Taiwan.  A large fraction of Taiwan’s 
trade with China is still reported as trade with Hong Kong, which jumped from 8.2 percent of Taiwan’s 
trade in 1990 to 13.0 percent in 1995 (Table 1.2, panel A). 
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East Asia. Most interesting perhaps is Europe, whose relative importance to East Asian 
trade has declined monotonically and nearly uniformly (except Indonesia) over the last 
fifteen years. The same diversion of market share is occurring with respect to the residual, 
rest of the world region, including South Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union. 
Together, these areas have steadily declined in relative importance as markets for East 
Asian goods. 
 Panels C and D of Tables 1.2 tell a story analogous to that of Panels A and B, but 
this time from the perspective of all the 15 APEC economies considered here. The East 
Asian 10 are aggregated in the first row for comparison, while the remaining rows detail 
trade shares for the NAFTA countries, Australia, New Zealand (referred to sub-regionally 
as ANZ), and a representative APEC-15 aggregate.  
 Note first that the NAFTA and ANZ countries generally had significant and 
steadily increasing trade shares to East Asia. Although Mexico apparently has not 
committed itself beyond 6 percent of total trade, the rest of these countries now maintain 
over 10 percent, and in some cases almost half, of their trade with East Asian. Japan 
appears to be the primary partner. The real growth in trade has been to other East Asian 
countries, particularly China, with respect to which most trade shares have at least doubled.  
 Such imbalances also reveal an important difference between the East Asian (EA) 
and the NAFTA members of APEC. Trade by the latter group is more diversified outside 
the Pacific, and this has advantages and disadvantages for all members. The NAFTA 
countries are less regionally dependent on EA markets, thus can expect to see slower trade 
growth than their EA partners as long as this region is the most rapidly growing in the 
world. EA countries have the good fortune to be concentrated in trade growth markets, but 
relatively less bargaining power in a global trading context. 
 Panel D of Table 1.2 summarizes the trade links among the EA-10, NAFTA 
countries, and ANZ, as well as for the APEC-15 as a whole. The first group has already 
been discussed in the context of Panel B, but comparison with the others indicates the real 
trade diversification the non-EA members bring to APEC. This diversification mainly 
takes the form of increased European, Latin American, and intra-NAFTA market access. 
Given the scale of these three, if not their growth rates, this is a very attractive component 
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of the APEC regional accord from the East Asian (and ANZ) perspective. Canada and 
Mexico’s trade dependence on the US limits the diversity they contribute to APEC, but it 
is worth noting that the US trade share to EA is larger than its combined NAFTA share. 
This fact, combined with the relative growth rates of the two regions, helps explain the 
impetus coming from Washington for this agreement. Indeed, the APEC-15 accounted for 
64.7 percent of US trade in 1995, and almost 90 percent for its other NAFTA partners. 
 The receding markets during this period are Europe and ROW, which have lost 
significant trade share from EA-10, AFTA, and APEC-15 since 1990. In 1995, Europe 
only absorbed 16.2 percent of APEC-15 trade, and the residual ROW only 8.1 percent. 
Although the relative merits of regionalism and globalization are still being intensively 
discussed, the APEC regional initiative certainly covers the vast majority of the member 
countries’ current trade. For this reason, APEC’s success is essential to realizing the trade 
potential of the regional economies, and it will be a forceful precedent for global 
liberalization. 
 
3 Trade Policy Issues 
 The dynamism of the Pacific regional economy is apparent not only in the volume 
of trade, but in the rapid evolution of trade relations. Beginning from a post-colonial 
setting, the early Asian growth economies built prosperity on neo-mercantilist strategies of 
intensive export promotion, protected internal markets, and accelerating capital 
accumulation. This approach was feasible as long as these countries were relatively few in 
number and their market shares in other countries remained small, but it is incompatible 
with the broadly based multilateral trade and growth we see in the region today. Pacific 
trade has expanded in recent years largely because of qualitative changes in policy that 
take account of commonality of interests. Increased recognition of the importance of 
reciprocity, joint venture activity, and even explicit regional agreements have all 
contributed to an expanding universe of economic opportunity for the regional economies. 
The papers in Section II of this book evaluate some of the leading issues in this area, with 
particular emphasis on the challenges facing policy makers. 
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 In Chapter 2, Hiro Lee and David Roland-Holst examine the state of the trade 
relationship between the two largest economies in the region, the U.S. and Japan. In the 
half-century since its modern inception, trade between these two industrial powers has 
matured, but now it faces one of its greatest challenges, shifting comparative advantage. 
Indeed, recent friction in this relationship is perhaps an inevitable result of its failure to 
adapt to changing circumstances. Improved U.S. export competitiveness in agriculture and 
service has coincided with Japanese intensification of industrial exports, yet trade policies 
in the two countries have not fully accommodated this reality. Lee and Roland-Holst use a 
two-country calibrated general equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the opportunity cost 
of this policy dissonance in terms of foregone economic opportunity, efficiency, and 
incomes. In addition to detailing the complex adjustments that would ensue, the authors 
conclude that both countries would gain substantially if they removed the significant 
residual protection against each other’s imports. Furthermore, they show that free 
movements of direct investment flows provide greater welfare for the two countries than 
fully liberalized bilateral trade without such investment flows.  
 A broader lesson may be drawn from this work, one that resonates with the later 
contributions. Traditional neo-mercantilist policies are an artifact of a fading era, when 
trading partners were at vastly different levels of development. They are incompatible with 
an economic future that promised increasing parity between industrialized, diversified 
economies. The adjustment costs of outgrowing these bad habits may be non-negligible, 
but the economic potential thereby liberated is far greater. 
 In Chapter 3, Marcus Noland takes a closer look at the special characteristics of 
Asian exporting economies. In doing so, he reveals much about the transition alluded to 
above. In a thorough review of export-based growth experience in East Asia, Noland 
compares output and trade composition in the high performing Asian economies with 
countries in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. His empirical results suggest that while 
the Asian countries as a whole may exhibit greater export orientation, this is matched on the 
import side and should instead be interpreted as greater trade orientation. In addition, given 
the diversity of the Asian economies, it is difficult to characterize an “Asian export model” 
as such. Concerning the sectoral composition of exports, Asian economies have specialized 
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more rapidly in some manufacturing industries than would be predicted by factor endowment 
changes. Interestingly, Noland does detect high degrees of specialization, apparently more 
associated with targeted industrial policies than with relative factor endowments, yet there 
is little evidence that these specializations are innately Asian or even likely to be persistent 
sources of comparative advantage. 
 The three chapters in Section III deal with the dominant trade policy issue in the 
Pacific, regionalism. Just as Europe did as its economies modernized and diversified after 
World War II, today’s East Asian economies are looking to increased economic 
interdependence as a source of new growth and mutual advantage. Unlike Europe in the 
1950s and 1960s, however, Asian regional consciousness is embedded in an era of 
globalization, where both official and market institutions are promoting open 
multilateralism on a worldwide scale. Thus the choice for Asia is less obvious, and 
regionalism, even as a piecemeal approach to globalization, is a more uncertain prospect.  
 Arvind Panagariya presents a detailed analysis of this complex issue in Chapter 4, 
weighing the apparent merits of incremental cooperation against the more subtle pitfalls of 
global market segmentation. After thoroughly scrutinizing the options open to East Asian 
economies, Panagariya expresses deep skepticism on about the wisdom of systems of trade 
preferences within or across the region. He argues that there is little rational for such an 
approach on theoretical grounds, and it seems quite unrealistic on practical grounds. 
Instead, the argues, these economies would be better off upholding more universal 
principles of economic openness, using the APEC forum, if necessary, to leverage a faster 
transition to WTO-sponsored global liberalization. 
 In Chapter 5, Hiro Lee and Brian Woodall use empirical methods to evaluate 
regional trade policy in the context of domestic political agendas. Since trade policy is 
often formulated from the bottom up, it is reasonable to expect that a more modern view of 
national interest, such as that based on trade reciprocity, might encounter conflicts with 
established domestic interests. Lee and Woodall compare the prospects of Pacific 
regionalism from two perspectives, a heuristic indicator analysis designed to measure to 
domestic political feasibility and a multicountry CGE model. Their findings indicate that 
one can expect significant contention between vested domestic economic interests and 
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those who rightly anticipate significant economic gains from more liberal trade. This 
conclusion may help explain the unusual degree of policy independence that APEC 
members have negotiated into their agreements. 
 A special challenge facing East Asia is reconciling new regional and global trade 
initiatives with older multilateral agreements. ASEAN is one such arrangement, forged in a 
different time and with somewhat different objectives including security, but it has evolved 
in response to new economic forces. In Chapter 6, Tan Kong Yam clearly enunciates an 
East Asian perspective on both APEC and globalization. Among other things, he 
emphasizes the pivotal but somewhat ambiguous role of the US in most of the worlds 
major regional initiatives, arguing that East Asia generally and Southeast Asia in particular 
should hedge itself to avoid being played off against the EU or NAFTA. Tan also observes 
that complexities in US-Japan and US-China bilateral relations should not obscure 
Southeast Asia’s fundamental interest in more open trade with both sides. In concluding, 
Tan sustains Panagariya’s case that APEC should only be implemented as a complement, 
rather than substitute, for more open global trade. He further amplifies by arguing that 
ASEAN should leverage its position in APEC to push the latter organization closer to 
WTO standards. This argument is based on the belied that the WTO holds the promise “to 
sustain economic dynamism in the Pacific Basin.”  
 
4 Foreign Direct Investment and Private Multilateralism 
 In concert with, and sometimes well ahead of, official efforts at multilateralism, 
market forces and private enterprise have moved rapidly to expand the collaborative basis 
for trade across the Pacific region. This market-directed interaction has few direct 
counterparts in national trade policy, yet strongly influences and is influenced by the latter. 
While not a sufficient condition for policy coherence between trading partners, it is 
certainly necessary for such policies to succeed. The process arises from the myriad of 
small and large business initiatives referred to above as “The Invisible Handshake”. While 
it may be difficult to observe the countless communications, meetings, and contracts that 
make up this web of market interdependence, we can observe it indirectly in the flows of 
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foreign direct investment (FDI) that facilitate it. The papers in Section IV all examine FDI 
in the Pacific region, and from these comes a better understanding of one of the most 
dynamic determinants of regional trade and economic growth, private multilateralism. 
 In Chapter 7, Peter Petri and Michael Plummer give an extensive survey of FDI. 
After a brief theoretical overview of the determinants of FDI, the key empirical 
characteristics of FDI flows, and related research, the authors provide their own empirical 
results in the Pacific context. Among other things, their findings emphasize the importance 
of FDI as a mediator of intraindustry and intrafirm trade. By extensifying and intensifying 
commercial linkages, FDI has accelerated the growth of regional trade and strengthened 
the basis for multilateralism.  
 Given its senior status among modern Asian export economies, Japan has 
undergone more extensive adaptation to the changing regional economy. For example, it 
was the first traditional Asian exporter to diversify itself from commodities to capital 
services, shifting production capacity abroad and becoming a private-sector partner in 
regional development. Initiating these financial links to neighboring economies has had 
complex implications for the private sectors in both Japan and its partner countries, and 
this experience has amplified the debate over whether trade and investment are substitutes 
or complements. In Chapter 8, Masahiro Kawai and Shujiro Urata appraise this question in 
the context of Japanese manufacturing. These authors find strong and positive two-way 
interactions, complementarity, between trade and FDI. Their results for a variety of 
Japanese industries demonstrate that FDI not only expands external capacity, but facilitates 
domestic capacity use. In short, FDI is an essential factor in deepening regional 
interdependence. 
 In the same context, Korea’s experience with outward FDI has many similarities 
and some important differences. In Chapter 9, Jai-Won Ryou examines patterns of Korean 
overseas investment form the perspective of labor utilization. Of particular interest in this 
article is the emphasis on outward FDI as a potential threat to domestic employment, a 
concern more often raised in Europe and North America. In the Korean context, Ryou 
finds the domestic effects of outward FDI differ across sectors, but that the overall effect 
on trade and the economy reaffirms strong complementarity. While some labor-intensive 
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sectors, like textiles, have experienced “de-industrialization” symptoms in concert with 
FDI outflows, these are natural attributes of shifting comparative advantage in the global 
economy and it would be risky to jeopardize emergent trade opportunities by trying to 
obstruct this market-driven adjustment process with protectionist measures. The lessons 
drawn from this paper certainly have significance for other mature industrial countries. 
 The next two chapters reverse perspective on foreign capital flows, looking this 
time an inbound investment to two of the world’s largest and dynamic developing 
countries. In Chapter 10, Shang-Jin Wei examines the provocative question of whether or 
not China is an underachiever as a foreign investment destination. Despite the meteoric 
rise of foreign capital inflows into China and an equally rapid proliferation of joint 
ventures, the Wei infers that China is still behind its absorptive capacity and could 
probably utilize significantly more FDI in mutually profitable ventures. Using the same 
model, one that combines standard economic variables and indicators of the receptiveness 
of the investment environment, Wei shows that Hong Kong is a dramatic overachiever as 
an FDI destination. In summary, post-1997 China will be more average in all these 
respects, but given China’s size, it is still reasonable to expect dramatic future growth in its 
inbound FDI. 
 In Chapter 11, Iwan Azis examines FDI into Indonesia in a broader historical and 
institutional context. Azis begins with an authoritative review of the country’s experience 
with foreign investment, a lengthy transition from colonialism to inward orientation to 
outward orientation. One important insight from this long view of economic development 
is how well established many “modern” economic phenomena were across three centuries 
of colonialism: including FDI, intraindustry trade, export orientation, import substitution, 
and regionalism. The author then goes on to appraise the domestic effects of FDI on the 
modern economy, with particular emphasis on income distribution. He points out that 
historical FDI has not fostered very uniform income growth, particularly in the regional 
sense. This may contribute to political uncertainty unless future investment trends help 
diversify the economy and broaden its basis of income generation. 
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5 Trade, Resources, and the Environment 
 Most of the contributions to this book focus on the positive aspects of Pacific 
multilateralism — public and private initiatives to improve individual and collective living 
standards through expanded regional trade and economic growth. While reference has been 
made to institutional or structural impediments to this trend, most of the previous material 
focuses on the positive side of the policy agenda. There have been and will certainly be 
many serious challenges to expanding multilateralism, however, and this book would be 
incomplete without some substantive discussion of them.  
 Challenges to multilateralism that arise from past norms and traditional institutions 
are treated in the earlier chapters. The future holds many new challenges, most of which 
cannot be anticipated. An important one that is clearly discernible, however, is the 
environment, and we examine it in this book as a case study in the risks of policy discord. 
The status of the environment raises very intrinsic questions of national interest (e.g., local 
public health and resource degradation), yet these are increasingly linked to multilateral 
relations and global events. While the maturity of domestic environmental policies varies 
widely, a multilateral perspective on environment is relatively new. Indeed, this issue has 
in many ways grown up with the new regionalism and globalization debates, and trade and 
environment linkages have been intensively discussed and researched in recent years.11 
 The final two chapters of this book examine trade and environment issues from two 
perspectives, that of a regional trade agreement and that of a single, large country whose 
environmental policies have implications for trans-boundary pollution and other 
multilateral externalities. In the first case, John Beghin, David Roland-Holst, and 
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe use a CGE model of Mexico to assess the environmental 
effects of its accession to the NAFTA regional trade pact. Although this issue has been 
intensively debated before, during, and after the negotiation of the NAFTA, very little 
evidence has been presented about the economywide impact on the Mexican environment 
until now. The authors conclude that, contrary to some thinking that NAFTA would induce 
the country to specialize in pollution-intensive products, Mexico actually shifts the 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe (1994) for a survey. 
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composition of its economic activities toward lower average pollution-intensity. Despite 
this, however, aggregate growth impelled by trade liberalization leads to higher total 
pollution levels for the country. The authors then go on to examine a number of mitigation 
policies, however, and conclude that targeted emission taxes can achieve significant 
abatement for Mexico, while it still realizes most of the growth benefits accruing from the 
NAFTA agreement. 
 When the issue of pollution growth is raised in the Pacific region, attention is 
usually drawn to China. Because of this country’s combination of rapid economic growth, 
low current pollution per capita, and vast population, it is reasonable to expect dramatic 
changes in this country’s contribution to regional emission levels. In Chapter 13, two 
distinguished Chinese policy economists appraise this issue, beginning with an overview 
of environmental conditions and concluding with a discussion of trade linkages and 
multilateral externality issues. The authors concede that many challenges lie ahead for 
China in regulating its effect on the domestic and regional environment, but argue that 
multilateral cooperation in general and trade in particular can facilitate their efforts at 
pollution mitigation, greater energy efficiency, and more sustainable development policies. 
The threats that might be posed by acid rain, global warming, soil and other renewable 
resource depletion are very serious indeed. If more liberal trade contributed to faster 
technology transfer, stricter environmental standards induced by rising incomes, and more 
efficient and sustainable resource utilization, this would indeed be a triumph for 
multilateralism. 
 
6 Methodological Notes 
 The contributions in this book come from a group of experts with quite diverse 
backgrounds and professional emphasis. In order to achieve the greatest coherence and 
policy relevance in this collection, we have asked them to focus their analysis and 
methodology on a specific region and set of issues. While representing many different 
perspectives and insights, the empirical work represented here emphasizes two main 
approaches: general equilibrium simulation models and the so-called gravity equation 
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approach to econometric modeling. In this section, we provide a synopsis of each of these 
methods, with references to guide the interested reader to more complete introductions. 
 
6.1 Calibrated General Equilibrium Models 
 A confluence of neoclassical economic theory, dramatically improved computing 
and data resources, and renewed interest in reform-growth linkages has led to the advent of 
a new generation of policy simulation models. These calibrated general equilibrium (CGE) 
models are economywide in scope and simulate price-directed resource allocation in 
product and factor markets.12 While their veracity rests as much on assumptions and data 
quality as any empirical economics, these models have especially desirable properties:  
1) closed-form accounting for economic activity that helps ensure consistency; 
2) emphasis on linkages, which captures myriad indirect effects beyond the ken of partial 
equilibrium analysis or conventional intuition; 
3) a simulation structure permitting extensive counterfactual analysis in support of 
economic policymaking. 
 
 Because of these structural features, CGE models are particularly useful for 
detailed incidence analysis, where movements in relative prices of goods and factors can 
have pervasive effects on incomes. This approach has been widely applied for evaluating 
the economywide effects of trade and fiscal reforms, as well as other policies that entail 
removal or imposition of distortions to commodity or factor prices. By combining market 
simulation with detailed information on income and expenditure linkages, complex 
patterns of structural adjustment can be elucidated. 
 In recent years, the number of studies that employ CGE models has proliferated. 
Such models have now been constructed for over fifty countries, and they are in active use 
supporting government policy in countries as diverse as China, Morocco, and the U.S. A 
CGE model is particularly useful in assessing sectoral adjustments and income distribution 
                                                 
12 For more thorough background on this methodology, the reader is referred to Dervis, de Melo, and 
Robinson (1982), Shoven and Whalley (1984), Borges (1986),  Francois and Shiells (1994), and 
Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson (1997). 
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and is ideally suited to evaluating of new trading arrangements because it can detail the 
impacts on both member and nonmember countries. Studies evaluating the effects of 
alternative trade liberalization scenarios among Pacific Basin countries include Brown, 
Deardorff, and Stern (1996), Lee and Roland-Holst (1995), Lee, Roland-Holst, and van der 
Mensbrugghe (1997), Lewis, Robinson, and Wang (1995), and Young and Chye (1997). 
These studies generally find that, in percentage terms, both discriminatory and 
nondiscriminatory liberalization by East Asian or APEC countries would lead to welfare 
gains to developing countries (such as China and ASEAN) that are significantly greater 
than those to developed countries. Recent studies assessing the impact of the Uruguay 
Round (e.g., Francois, McDonald, and Nordström, 1996; Goldin, Knudsen, and van der 
Mensbrugghe, 1993; Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr, 1996; Hertel et al., 1996; Yang, 
Martin, and Yanagishima, 1997) also show substantial variations in the distribution of 
world welfare gains across regions. 
 
6.2 Gravity Models 
 The gravity model has been one of the most successful empirical tools in 
explaining cross-sectional trade patterns.13 In a simple form, it relates volume of trade 
between two countries positively to their incomes and negatively to geographical distance, 
analogous to gravitational attraction between two masses in physics. The standard gravity 
equation may be specified as: 
  ij
D
ijijjiij ueAdYYT ij543210
ββββββ= , (1.1) 
 
where Tij is the bilateral trade flow from country i to country j, Yi and Yj are the exporting 
and importing countries’ gross domestic products, and dij is the geographical or economic 
distance between the two countries. Dij is an array of dummy variables such as those for 
preferential trading arrangements, Aij is an array of other factors that could either facilitate 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Baldwin (1994) and Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) for surveys. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1995) stated that, “The gravity model has long been the work-horse for empirical studies of the pattern 
of trade.” 
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or impede trade between i and j, and uij is a log-normally distributed error term with 
E (log uij) = 0.14 
 Earlier empirical papers employing the gravity model to estimate trade flows (e.g., 
Tinbergen, 1962; Linnenmann, 1966; Leamer and Stern, 1970; Aitken, 1973; Leamer, 
1974) consistently provided a good fit, yet they were often criticized because of the 
absence of strong theoretical foundations. Anderson (1979) was the first to provide a 
rigorous economic justification, deriving a reduced-form gravity equation from a general 
equilibrium model incorporating the properties of expenditure systems.15 Subsequently, 
Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch.8) derived a version of the gravity equation from a 
model that consisted of sectors producing homogeneous products with constant returns to 
scale and those producing differentiated products with increasing returns to scale. 
 A series of papers by Bergstrand further developed microeconomic foundations of 
the gravity equation under alternative assumptions. In Bergstrand (1985) he assumed that 
goods are differentiated by country of origin and derived a generalized gravity equation 
consisting of price variables. He suggested that the assumption of perfect product 
substitutability would result in the omission of price variables and could lead to 
misspecification of the equation.16 In Bergstrand (1989) he assumed non-homothetic tastes 
for a representative consumer and relative factor-endowment differences between two 
monopolistically competitive sectors in a two-factor, two-sector, N-country model. His 
reduced-form equation consisted of the exporter’s national output and capital-labor ratio 
and the importer’s income and per capita income, as well as distance and price-related 
variables.  Using this theoretical framework, Bergstrand (1990) evaluated the determinants 
of cross-country bilateral intraindustry trade and presented some testable propositions. 
 Derivations of alternative versions of the gravity equation by Anderson (1979), 
Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Bergstrand (1985, 1989) did not directly base on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, but instead on product differentiation models. A recent 
                                                 
14 The per capita income variable is generally included in Aij as rich countries are expected to trade 
more than poor ones 
15 Linnenmann (1966), Leamer and Stern (1970), and Leamer (1974) attempted to provide theoretical 
foundations for the gravity model, but they lacked a compelling economic justification. 
16 Anderson (1979) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) also shared this view. 
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paper by Deardorff (1997) showed that the gravity equation can also be derived from two 
extreme cases of the H-O model — one with identical, homothetic preferences and 
frictionless trade, and the other with impeded trade where every country produces and 
exports different goods. Given that the gravity equation may be derived from a large class 
of models, Deardorff points out that its empirical success does not imply a support of any 
particular trade model.17 
 The main purpose of most of the empirical papers employing the gravity model has 
not been testing of an imperfect competition trade model, the H-O model, or any other 
trade models, however. Instead, a number of recent papers (e.g., Frankel, 1993; Frankel 
and Wei, 1993a,b; Frankel, Stein, and Wei, 1995; Baldwin, 1994; Oguledo and MacPhee, 
1994; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995) have attempted to capture a special regional effect 
on bilateral trade flows. This is accomplished by including a dummy variable for a 
common membership in a regional trade grouping. A major objective of these papers is to 
determine whether or not the high level of trade within a given region has been beyond 
what could be explained by economic characteristics common to bilateral trade throughout 
the world and thus could be attributable to the regional effect. 
 Although the gravity model might be able to describe factor movements as well as 
commodity movements between countries, that for foreign direct investment has not been 
formally derived. To date, Eaton and Tamura (1996) have made a good attempt to link 
between a theoretical model of trade and investment and gravity equations for trade and 
FDI. Specifically, they develop a model that can predict the extent to which innovators will 
alter exports and FDI to changes in the destination country’s characteristics. Inevitably, 
more theoretical work is needed to provide satisfactory explanations of the activities of 
multinational corporations and how they affect trade and direct investment decisions. 
 The gravity equation has increasingly been used to explain FDI flows (e.g., Eaton 
and Tamura, 1994, 1996; Kawai, 1994; Wei, 1996) with a relatively good fit. The 
determinants of bilateral FDI flows could differ from those of bilateral trade flows.  For 
                                                 
17 For example, Deardorff cites Helpman’s (1987) study which interpreted the good fit of the gravity 
equation with bilateral trade of the OECD countries as evidence for the monopolistic competition 
model.  
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example, in addition to the standard variables such as GDP, per capita GDP, and distance 
between two countries, Wei’s FDI equation in this volume includes the host country’s 
wage rate (labor cost), a measure of corruption and red tape, and a dummy variable for 
source and host countries that speak a common language. 
 Kawai and Urata’s and Ryou’s chapters explore interactions between bilateral FDI 
outflows and trade for Japanese and Korean industries.  Specifically, they examine whether 
outward FDI would lead to an increase in the source country’s trade and vise versa using 
gravity equations. They are aware of the FDI-trade simultaneity problem and use lagged 
values of trade and FDI in their FDI and trade equations, respectively. As long as the error 
terms in each equation are not serially correlated, lagged endogenous variables would be 
predetermined. This is likely to be the case when one only uses cross-country data, but is 
less likely to be the case when one uses a pooled cross-country, time-series data. 
 Despite these limitations, the chapters that employ gravity equations provide us 
with new insights on FDI in the Asia-Pacific region. Discussion by Kawai and Urata on 
Japanese FDI and patterns of trade by foreign affiliates of Japanese firms is important 
because Japan is the world’s largest FDI source country.  Korea has emerged as a major 
supplier of capital to China and the ASEAN countries, and Ryou’s chapter provides an 
excellent case study for Korea. Furthermore, these authors estimate trade and FDI flows 
for selected manufacturing industries, enabling the readers to examine the differences in 
behavior across sectors. 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
 The contributions to this volume were assembled to shed light on the most dynamic 
economic region of the world. We hope that the lessons learned thereby will help to sustain 
and propagate the successes of the Pacific Basin economies, making a lasting contribution 
to improved living standards around the world. For decades after World War II, many 
international trade and development economists were haunted by one question: Why, two 
hundred years after the Industrial Revolution, do more than three-quarters of humankind 
still live in poverty? Despite the best intentions of donors and social reformers, a 
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generation of development assistance and political experimentation produced no general 
prototype for rapid and sustainable growth in developing countries. Only in recent years, 
with the fuller articulation of economies in the Asian Pacific, and the advent of rapid 
growth in China and ASEAN countries, has a new paradigm for economic modernization 
begun to manifest itself. 
The early positive examples of this period, such as Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, gave some 
indications about how to industrialize in a modern, postwar era. These economies revealed 
the importance of leveraging domestic capacity growth with exports, dedicated public and 
private investment in infrastructure and, especially in human capital, and rigorous attention 
to market forces. Despite such important features, however, the example of early Asian 
export economies is of limited relevance to poor countries today. This is largely because 
the former based their industrialization and export strategies on neo-mercantilist principles, 
domestic protection and single-minded projection of national business interests into 
foreign export markets. Such an approach cannot be readily generalized across the 
developing world and in any case is inconsistent with the norms of multilateral trade 
prevailing today. 
What we see emerging now in the Pacific Basin is a new paradigm of market-directed 
economic coordination and the kind of synergistic multilateral growth envisioned by 
classical trade theorists, significantly improved upon by modern private enterprise. While 
elements of comparative advantage exert a strong influence on resource allocation in 
individual countries, specialization is much less extreme than that which resulted from 
historic trade patterns. Multinational business exerts a pervasive influence on growth 
patterns in these economies, replicating abroad to exploit not only natural resources but 
also internal markets in each country. By infusing each FDI destination with new capital, 
technology, and expertise, thousands of foreign private interests contribute simultaneously 
to greater economic diversity within each economy, greater uniformity across economies. 
For the poorer countries, the result is a broader basis for employment and opportunity in 
their own economy, leading to greater diversification, stability, and generally higher rates 
of growth in productivity and wages. 
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Two of the most compelling aspects of this new, private multilateralism are its spontaneity 
and collaborative nature. Historically, economic policy in general and trade policy in 
particular was closely circumscribed by official institutions representing abstraction 
notions of national interest. Like many forms of regulation, the relatively simplistic 
agendas of national trade policy do not mesh well with complex and often conflicting 
incentives/signals that permeate today’s international commerce. But the risks of 
commerce always carry the prospect of reward and, for every reticent trade negotiator, 
there may be hundreds of firms eager to establish a lucrative foreign partnership or open a 
new market. The resulting “Invisible Handshakes” ultimately serve national interest by 
transcending it, reaching beyond the short-term perspective of (e.g.) domestic protection to 
broaden the basis for economic activity globally and take a (national) material interest in 
the resulting economic growth.  
 The spontaneous and collaborative aspects of this process are intuitively appealing, 
but they also have one very profound historical implication. By transcending national 
policy control and relying instead on voluntary private cooperation, a multilateral basis for 
security may be emerging that is unprecedented in history. Private multilateralism is not 
simply a new source of global prosperity, it may be the new foundation for sustained 
global peace. If open multilateralism and market forces can supercede destructive national 
rivalry, it will be neither the End of History nor the Clash of Civilizations that prevail in 
the Pacific Century, but individual aspiration and enterprise, freeing most of us at last from 
the millennial scourges of war and deprivation. 
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Table 1.1 
Economic Indicators for Major APEC Countries 
 
   
 GNP per capita Population   
 (in US$) (in PPP$) (millions) Real GDP Growth Rates  Exports/GDP (%) Imports/GDP (%)
   
 1995 1995 mid-1995 1970-80 1980-90 1990-95  1970 1995 1970 1995
   
   
Japan 39,640 22,110 125.2 5.0 4.1 1.2  9.5 12.3 9.3 11.1
China 620 2,920 1200.2 5.7 8.6 11.2  2.9 21.5 3.0 19.1
Korea 9,700 11,450 44.9 9.5 9.7 7.8  9.5 27.5 22.6 29.7
Taiwan 12,490 . . . 21.2 10.2 8.0 6.3  26.2 42.2 26.9 39.1
Hong Kong 22,990 22,950 6.2 9.3 7.1 5.3  66.5 120.9 76.5 134.2
Singapore 26,730 22,770 3.0 8.5 6.4 8.5  82.0 141.2 129.8 148.6
Malaysia 3,890 9,020 20.1 7.8 5.2 8.9  42.5 83.1 35.3 84.0
Thailand 2,740 7,540 58.2 7.2 7.6 8.9  10.0 31.6 18.4 38.0
Indonesia 980 3,800 193.3 7.6 5.5 7.1  12.0 22.9 10.9 18.3
Philippines 1,050 2,850 68.6 6.3 0.9 2.3  14.6 23.4 17.2 35.7
U.S. 26,980 26,980 263.1 3.0 3.4 2.5  5.7 8.1 5.5 10.3
Canada 19,380 21,130 29.6 3.9 3.4 1.6  23.3 32.5 20.6 28.9
Mexico 3,320 6,400 91.8 5.2 1.0 0.8  7.7 23.9 9.7 21.6
Australia 18,720 18,940 18.1 3.0 3.4 2.6  12.5 14.8 11.8 16.4
New Zealand 14,340 16,360 3.6 2.3 1.9 3.2  19.7 25.1 20.2 25.5
   
 
Sources:  
   World Bank, World Development Report, 1982, 1992, 1997. 
   International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
   OECD, Main Economic Indicators, June 1996. 
   United Nations, National Accounts Statistics, various issues. 
   Rupublic of China, Executive Yuan, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, various issues. 
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Table 1.2.  Gross Trade Shares of Major APEC Countries 
(Percentages) 
 
Panel A.  East Asian countries’ bilateral trade  
       
     Trading Partner   
       
       
   East    
Country Year  Asia JPN CHN KOR TWN HKG SGP MYS THA IDN PHL 
       
       
Japan 1980  24.0 . . . 3.4 3.0 3.6 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.1 5.9 1.3 
  (JPN) 1990  28.2 . . . 3.5 5.6 4.6 2.9 2.7 2.1 2.5 3.4 0.9 
 1995  38.8 . . . 7.4 6.2 5.6 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.8 3.1 1.4 
       
China 1980  42.5 24.4 . . . 0.1 0.0 13.1 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.1 0.9 
  (CHN) 1990  58.5 14.4 . . . 0.6 2.2 35.7 2.3 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.3 
 1995  54.5 20.5 . . . 6.0 6.4 15.9 2.0 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.5 
       
Korea 1980  33.0 22.6 0.1 . . . 1.6 2.3 1.1 1.6 0.6 2.1 1.1 
  (KOR) 1990  36.2 23.1 0.5 . . . 2.0 3.3 2.0 1.7 1.1 2.0 0.6 
 1995  42.3 19.1 6.4 . . . 2.5 4.4 3.4 2.1 1.3 2.4 0.8 
       
Taiwan 1980  32.3 19.0 0.0 1.2 . . . 4.6 1.9 1.5 0.7 2.6 0.8 
  (TWN) 1990  39.3 19.9 0.3 2.1 . . . 8.2 3.0 1.7 1.5 1.8 0.9 
 1995  49.2 20.2 1.6 3.2 . . . 13.0 3.4 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.1 
       
Hong Kong 1980  44.1 13.6 12.7 2.3 5.4 . . . 5.3 0.9 1.2 1.7 1.2 
  (HKG) 1990  59.1 10.9 30.8 3.4 6.6 . . . 3.6 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.7 
 1995  63.0 10.7 34.8 3.4 5.8 . . . 4.1 1.4 1.2 0.7 0.8 
       
Singapore 1980  48.9 13.2 2.1 1.3 2.3 4.5 . . . 14.0 3.0 7.7 0.8 
  (SGP) 1990  48.7 14.4 2.5 2.5 3.8 4.5 . . . 12.9 4.4 2.7 0.8 
 1995  55.9 14.3 2.7 3.5 4.0 5.7 . . . 16.9 5.3 2.1 1.2 
       
Malaysia 1980  49.7 22.1 1.9 1.9 3.2 1.6 15.2 . . . 2.1 0.5 1.3 
  (MYS) 1990  55.6 19.7 2.0 3.6 3.9 2.5 18.9 . . . 3.0 1.1 0.9 
 1995  55.6 20.2 2.4 3.5 4.1 3.7 16.2 . . . 3.3 1.4 0.7 
       
Thailand 1980  40.0 18.3 3.4 1.5 2.2 2.6 6.9 2.9 . . . 1.8 0.6 
  (THA) 1990  47.7 25.0 2.4 2.5 3.7 2.6 7.4 3.0 . . . 0.6 0.5 
 1995  50.5 23.8 2.9 2.5 3.7 2.8 9.2 3.7 . . . 1.1 0.8 
       
Indonesia 1980  60.7 41.7 0.6 1.5 4.0 0.9 10.0 0.3 0.9 . . . 0.8 
  (IDN) 1990  58.0 34.3 3.1 4.9 4.6 1.9 6.7 1.1 0.8 . . . 0.5 
 1995  56.3 27.3 3.9 7.2 4.6 3.0 5.4 2.5 1.7 . . . 0.7 
       
Philippines 1980  37.9 22.0 1.8 2.4 2.9 2.7 1.7 1.8 0.6 2.1 . . . 
  (PHL) 1990  40.9 19.0 1.2 3.4 4.9 4.3 3.5 2.0 1.4 1.2 . . . 
 1995  46.8 20.0 2.1 4.1 4.7 5.0 4.4 2.2 2.6 1.6 . . . 
       
Sources: 
   International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
   Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, Taiwan Area, Republic of China. 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
 
Panel B.  East Asia’s trade with NAFTA, Australasia, and non-APEC countries 
        
     Trading Partner    
        
        
   East  Latin    
Country Year  Asia USA CAN MEX AUS NZL APEC Amer Europea ROW World 
        
        
Japan 1980  24.0 20.0 2.6 0.8 3.7 0.5 51.6 4.4 11.3 32.7 100.0 
   1990  28.2 27.5 2.9 0.8 3.7 0.6 63.8 2.8 20.1 13.3 100.0 
 1995  38.8 25.4 2.1 0.6 2.9 0.5 70.4 3.2 16.4 9.9 100.0 
        
China 1980  42.5 12.8 2.5 0.3 3.4 0.5 62.0 3.0 16.1 19.0 100.0 
   1990  58.5 10.2 1.6 0.2 1.6 0.2 72.2 1.5 13.9 12.4 100.0 
 1995  54.5 14.6 1.3 0.1 1.5 0.2 72.2 1.9 15.0 10.9 100.0 
        
Korea 1980  33.0 23.5 1.8 0.3 2.2 0.3 61.1 1.9 11.5 25.5 100.0 
   1990  36.2 27.0 2.4 0.6 2.6 0.4 69.2 2.2 15.0 13.6 100.0 
 1995  42.3 20.9 1.7 0.5 2.5 0.4 68.3 3.0 13.8 14.9 100.0 
        
Taiwan 1980  32.3 28.9 1.8 0.3 2.7 0.2 66.1 2.4 12.6 18.9 100.0 
   1990  39.3 28.1 2.0 0.4 2.4 0.3 72.5 1.8 17.3 8.4 100.0 
 1995  49.2 21.9 1.4 0.3 2.0 0.3 75.1 2.1 14.6 8.2 100.0 
        
Hong Kong 1980  44.1 17.5 1.2 0.1 1.8 0.3 65.2 1.5 19.7 13.7 100.0 
   1990  59.1 16.1 1.1 0.2 1.2 0.2 77.9 1.1 16.0 5.0 100.0 
 1995  63.0 14.4 1.1 0.2 1.1 0.2 79.9 1.5 13.8 4.8 100.0 
        
Singapore 1980  48.9 13.1 0.6 0.1 3.0 1.0 66.6 1.5 13.4 18.5 100.0 
   1990  48.7 18.0 0.7 0.1 2.1 0.3 70.0 1.1 15.1 13.8 100.0 
 1995  55.9 16.3 0.4 0.1 1.8 0.2 74.8 1.0 14.0 10.2 100.0 
        
Malaysia 1980  49.7 15.3 0.7 0.0 3.2 0.7 69.6 0.5 17.5 12.3 100.0 
   1990  55.6 16.9 0.9 0.1 2.6 0.5 76.6 1.1 16.5 5.8 100.0 
 1995  55.6 18.5 0.7 0.2 2.1 0.3 77.5 1.1 15.8 5.6 100.0 
        
Thailand 1980  40.0 13.4 1.0 0.1 1.5 0.3 56.3 0.7 21.1 22.0 100.0 
   1990  47.7 15.7 1.2 0.3 1.7 0.3 66.7 1.4 20.7 11.1 100.0 
 1995  50.5 14.2 0.8 0.2 1.6 0.2 67.5 1.1 16.5 14.9 100.0 
        
Indonesia 1980  60.7 16.7 0.4 0.1 2.1 0.5 80.5 3.0 9.1 7.5 100.0 
   1990  58.0 12.3 1.1 0.2 3.4 0.4 75.5 1.1 16.6 6.9 100.0 
 1995  56.3 12.5 1.0 0.2 3.3 0.4 73.9 1.4 18.6 6.1 100.0 
        
Philippines 1980  37.9 24.5 1.0 0.2 2.4 0.6 66.6 1.5 14.3 17.6 100.0 
   1990  40.9 26.6 1.5 0.1 2.4 0.5 72.0 1.9 14.9 11.3 100.0 
 1995  46.8 25.0 1.1 0.2 2.1 0.4 75.5 1.2 13.8 9.5 100.0 
        
 
a Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
 
Panel C.  APEC countries’ trade with East Asian countries 
       
     Trading Partner   
       
       
   East    
Country Year  Asia JPN CHN KOR TWN HKG SGP MYS THA IDN PHL 
       
       
10 East Asian 1980  33.9 11.0 3.0 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.5 1.2 4.1 1.1 
  Countries 1990  41.3 11.3 5.7 3.5 3.8 6.0 3.6 2.6 2.0 2.2 0.7 
 1995  49.2 12.5 8.7 4.3 4.5 5.6 4.3 3.8 2.5 2.0 1.0 
       
U.S. 1980  22.9 10.9 1.0 1.8 3.1 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.4 1.4 0.8 
  (USA) 1990  32.3 15.6 2.3 3.7 3.7 1.8 2.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.7 
 1995  35.2 14.1 4.5 3.7 3.4 1.8 2.5 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.9 
       
Canada 1980  7.9 4.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
  (CAN) 1990  11.6 6.2 1.0 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 
 1995  11.0 4.9 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 
       
Mexico 1980  5.7 4.7 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
  (MEX) 1990  6.8 4.9 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
 1995  5.9 3.0 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 
       
Australia 1980  37.9 22.0 2.5 1.6 2.5 1.8 2.7 1.7 0.5 1.9 0.7 
  (AUS) 1990  43.8 22.5 2.6 4.1 3.7 2.1 3.6 1.6 1.1 1.9 0.6 
 1995  48.4 19.1 4.7 5.7 4.1 2.6 4.2 2.6 1.9 2.6 0.8 
       
New Zealand 1980  25.1 13.5 1.9 0.8 NA 1.3 3.9 1.1 0.4 1.6 0.7 
  (NZL) 1990  27.9 15.6 1.1 2.9 2.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.7 0.9 0.5 
 1995  32.9 15.0 3.0 3.4 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.0 1.3 0.6 
       
15 APEC 1980  26.4 10.6 1.9 1.8 NA 2.0 1.9 1.5 0.7 2.5 0.8 
Countries 1990  34.8 12.5 3.9 3.3 3.4 3.8 2.6 1.8 1.4 1.4 0.6 
 1995  40.5 12.2 6.5 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.3 2.8 1.9 1.4 0.9 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
 
Panel D.  APEC countries’ trade with NAFTA, Australasia, and non-APEC countries 
        
     Trading Partner    
        
        
   East  Latin    
Country Year  Asia USA CAN MEX AUS NZL APEC Amer Europea ROW World 
        
        
10 East Asian 1980  33.9 19.2 1.9 0.5 3.1 0.5 59.1 3.1 13.0 24.8 100.0 
Countries 1990  41.3 22.3 2.0 0.5 2.7 0.4 69.3 2.0 17.6 11.2 100.0 
 1995  49.2 19.6 1.4 0.4 2.2 0.4 73.1 2.2 15.2 9.6 100.0 
        
U.S. 1980  22.9 . . . 15.7 5.7 1.4 0.3 46.0 13.7 23.3 17.1 100.0 
   1990  32.3 . . . 19.4 6.5 1.5 0.3 60.0 6.8 24.3 8.9 100.0 
   1995  35.2 . . . 20.3 8.0 1.1 0.2 64.7 7.0 20.7 7.6 100.0 
        
Canada 1980  7.9 63.4 . . . 0.6 0.8 0.2 72.9 2.8 11.9 12.5 100.0 
 1990  11.6 69.3 . . . 0.9 0.6 0.1 82.5 1.7 11.6 4.2 100.0 
 1995  11.0 74.1 . . . 1.4 0.5 0.1 87.1 1.7 8.8 2.5 100.0 
        
Mexico 1980  5.7 63.0 1.3 . . . 0.1 0.1 70.3 5.4 16.4 7.9 100.0 
 1990  6.8 67.6 1.1 . . . 0.1 0.3 76.0 5.6 16.6 1.8 100.0 
 1995  5.9 79.2 2.2 . . . 0.1 0.1 87.4 4.4 7.3 0.9 100.0 
        
Australia 1980  37.9 16.5 2.4 0.1 . . . 4.1 61.1 1.1 20.4 18.7 100.0 
 1990  43.8 17.6 1.9 0.2 . . . 4.7 68.2 1.0 21.4 9.4 100.0 
 1995  48.4 14.4 1.8 0.2 . . . 5.9 70.7 1.0 19.6 8.7 100.0 
        
New Zealand 1980  25.1 13.7 2.3 0.3 15.8 . . . 57.3 1.2 23.3 18.1 100.0 
 1990  27.9 15.5 1.8 0.7 19.3 . . . 65.2 1.4 20.7 12.7 100.0 
 1995  32.9 14.3 1.7 0.3 21.0 . . . 70.2 1.7 18.6 9.5 100.0 
        
15 APEC 1980  26.4 17.3 7.0 2.4 2.1 0.5 55.8 7.1 17.2 19.8 100.0 
  Countries 1990  34.8 19.8 7.7 2.5 2.1 0.5 67.4 3.7 19.4 9.5 100.0 
 1995  40.5 19.8 6.9 2.7 1.7 0.4 72.1 3.6 16.2 8.1 100.0 
        
 
 
 
